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Abtract 
 
The EMU assigns a very marginal role to economic policy and relies on the leading idea that, if 
prices are kept constant, there will be an automatic convergence towards long-run equilibrium 
income. These beliefs represent the theoretical underpinnings of fiscal and monetary policy 
strategies in Europe. In order to highlight the weakness of these foundations, the paper evaluates 
empirically the effects of public expenditure and interest rate setting on equilibrium income in Italy 
from 1998 to 2008. The analysis supports the conclusions that government spending has a positive 
impact on national income while inflation targeting has a negative impact. Moreover the empirical 
evidence shows that a high level of debt does not produce negative effects on GDP. Finally, at a 
time of financial crisis, these results appear to be reinforced for fiscal policy, but weakened for 
monetary policy. The paper finally states that the EMU’s rigid rules for both fiscal and monetary 
policy have recessive attitudes, and limit the use of instruments to deal with high levels of 
unemployment, definitely undermining the future existence of the single-currency area. 
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1. Introduction 
The policy framework of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is based on the idea that monetary 
and fiscal policies can be effective only if they follow rigid rules. This leads to a subordination of 
any other policy target to the wider objective of the stability of the Euro. This stability is considered 
to be the necessary condition for long-run convergence towards the natural unemployment rate. 
The global financial crisis that occurred in 2008 has shown dramatically that sometimes this 
convergence does not happen automatically and has brought some economists to consider that 
policy interventions could be necessary to sustain development. The strategy of allowing market 
forces – which, in the long run could lead to steady growth, regional convergence and sound public 
budgets – to operate freely has apparently failed. 
The European policy framework relies on the conclusion that, following the rational expectation 
hypothesis, “only unanticipated money matters” (Lucas 1972, Sargent and Wallace 1975, Kydland 
and Prescott 1977) and that public expenditure just creates expectations for greater future taxation 
and public debt (Barro 1974). These analytical results have been reinforced by studies underlining 
the immoral behaviour of politicians. They rarely aim to serve the public interest, but often just seek 
to be re-elected: therefore they subordinate decisions about the optimal policy to the consensus 
mechanism (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). 
In the EMU, central banks and national governments are denied any active role in influencing 
equilibrium income because: 
1. Short-term policies are not desirable. Even if they could have positive effects in the short-
run, the final result is just an increase of inflation;  
2. Inflation is a monetary phenomenon. It is possible to control the quantity of money in 
circulation to control the inflation rate; 
3. Gross domestic product and unemployment fluctuate around their long-run value. The 
latter is independent of active fiscal and monetary policies; 
These principles are the theoretical foundation of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact, whose general content is to ensure that monetary variables do not disturb the 
spontaneous convergence towards the ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU) 
and to help the European Central Bank to reach its goal of price stability (Arestis, McCauley and 
Sawyer 2001, Arestis and Sawyer 2003, 2005). National governments belonging to the EMU are 
obliged to respect rigid parameters and cannot use fiscal policy freely to increase growth and 
employment, or they can use it when not needed3. 
However, income and employment are not just supply-side determined, even in the long run4. 
Current events have revived interest in the effectiveness of economic policy, both fiscal and 
monetary. Concerning monetary policy, a central bank moving interest rates is able to influence 
private demand through its effects on both investment and consumption. An inflation-targeting 
policy, in this respect, could be very counterproductive because of its indirect influence on 
aggregate demand5. Concerning fiscal policy it still could have an active role – through the 
Keynesian multiplier – in influencing the output growth.  
                                               
3
 This blind limit imposed on fiscal policy weakens the monetary union and undermines the feasibility of its existence in 
the long run. This position is discussed in depth in a dedicated number of the Eastern Economic Journal for winter 
1999, see, in particular, Kregel (1999) and Parguez (1999). See also Krugmann (2009a). 
4
 The NAIRU is generally viewed as supply-side determined equilibrium rate of unemployment. In most presentations 
of the NAIRU, aggregate demand plays no essential role in the determination of such an equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. In those macroeconomic models from which a NAIRU is derived as an appearance, the nature of the 
models is such that the level of aggregate demand has to adjust to the level of unemployment as set by the supply-side 
factors (Sawyer 2002). 
5
 “According to the conventional inflation targeting approach in order to achieve long-run price stability the CBs need 
to respond to any change in the current or expected rate of inflation, […] by raising the real interest rate, hence curbing 
the aggregate demand and current output. But what if current output is also affected by the level and time path of 
aggregate demand?” (Fontana and Palacio-Vera 2005, p.1). The theoretical foundation of this statement is that money is 
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In order to highlight the weakness of the EMU’s policy foundations, the paper evaluates empirically 
the effects of public expenditure and interest rate setting on equilibrium income in Italy from 1998 
to 2008. The empirical analysis supports the conclusions that government spending has a positive 
impact on national income, while inflation targeting has a negative one. Moreover the empirical 
evidence shows that a high level of debt – in contrast with Barro’s (1974) conclusions – did not 
produce negative effects on the level of GDP. Finally, we find – through the Kalman filter 
technique, that at a time of financial crisis, the results are reinforced for fiscal policy, while 
weakened for monetary policy. 
After considering the empirical results of the Italian experience, the paper finally reflects on the fact 
that EMU’s rigid rules for both fiscal and monetary policy have recessive attitudes and, during a 
period of crisis, in which other market forces do not work, they limit the use of the instruments 
capable of dealing with high levels of unemployment.  
Considering the more recent events, the paper draws the conclusion that the fear of the effects of 
unsound public finance and the aim of preserving the Euro stability limit the use of policy 
instruments undermining the future existence of the single-currency area. 
The work is organized as follows: section two briefly recalls the theoretical foundations and the 
empirical evidence about the inefficacy of fiscal and monetary policy; section three gives an 
account of the policy events that occurred in Italy before and after joining the EMU single currency 
area. Section four contains the empirical analysis of some indicators of policy interventions from 
1998 to 2008 and is divided into two parts. In the first, through the OLS technique, we evaluate the 
contribution of government spending and and the effects of interest rate setting to GDP, and in the 
second part we estimate – through the Kalman filter – the measure of this contribution within these 
ten years. Section five derives policy implications from the results.  
 
2. Do policy interventions increase growth? 
The ineffectiveness of economic policy in changing the value of equilibrium income has been 
widely maintained in the economic literature, and to conduct an exhaustive review would require 
much more than a paragraph.  
On the side of monetary policy the mainstream literature can be divided into two streams of 
thought. The first refers to Lucas’s critique, which extends very old classical conclusions about the 
long-run neutrality of money, according to which expansive monetary policies have neither short- 
nor long-term effects. On the contrary, it could be destabilizing through the influence on prices 
expectations. All a central bank has to do – as the Taylor rule suggests – is to set the interest rate in 
order to counterbalance any inflationary pressure coming from the market. This strategy would 
assure automatic convergence towards the level of full employment. 
The second stream of thought can be termed New Keynesian Macroeconomics (also known as new 
consensus macroeconomics; see Fontana 2009), according to which monetary policy could be 
effective because of labour, goods and credit market rigidities (Blanchard 2008). These rigidities 
“anchor expectations” and monetary policy “can be more activist in the short term” (Peson 2008). 
The empirical analysis of the European Central Bank for the Euro area (ECB Working papers from 
no. 91 to no. 114) supports these conclusions because (a) monetary policy decisions appear to have 
temporary effects; (b) these effects decrease as long as time goes on; (c) prices effects are lasting 
even if reduced at the beginning; (d) apparent initial real effects are due to prices and wages 
stickiness. Despite Lucas’s (1977) well-known conclusion that “only unanticipated money matters”, 
there is a relevant body of empirical literature that is not consistent with this, even among consensus 
economists. For instance, Cochrane (1998) finds that monetary policy has real effects even if it is 
expected. This result is reinforced by the famous contributions of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999 
and 2000) and Galì and Gertler (2007), who find that – because of imperfect competition – it can be 
effective to reduce unemployment, without leading to higher inflation.  
                                                                                                                                                            
endogenous and therefore dependent on current output: any manoeuvre to control money – in order to be effective – 
must have effects on current output. See Symposium (2002). 
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Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1999) show that the practice of setting interest rates could 
have recessive influences when the inflation rate, actual and expected, is very low. This result 
depends on the fact that central banks cannot fix negative interest rates. 
On the side of fiscal policy, the theoretical underpinnings of its inefficacy are: (1) the crowding-out 
effect; (2) Barro’s reinterpretation of the Ricardian equivalence; and (3) the inflationary effect. 
Governments are said to cause interest rates to increase in order to convince the public to buy 
bonds. The increase in interest rates would crowd-out private investment, and cause a reduction in 
the equilibrium income. The final result would be a total or partial offsetting of the effects of the 
increase in public expenditure. As a final point, Robert Barro (1974), revisiting Ricardian 
conclusions about the intertemporal equilibrium between income and expenditure, concluded that 
public expenditure in the present causes expectation of greater future taxation, higher interest rates 
and greater public debt. These expected effects – joined with the circumstance that government 
bonds do not represent wealth – reduce current consumption and offset the increase in income 
generated by the increase in autonomous demand. 
In synthesis, any government borrowing to finance public expenditure must be done at the expense 
either of investment or of consumption (Cochrane 2009, Fama 2009). 
As Krugman says, this is “one of the most basic fallacies in economics – interpreting an accounting 
identity as a behavioural relationship […]. An increase of G [public expenditure] doesn’t reduce I 
[or C] one for one, it increases GDP which leads to higher S and T.” (Krugman 2009b). Reich 
(2009) shares the same point of view. 
It has to be noted that the efficacy of fiscal policy is largely dependent on its interaction with 
monetary policy. When the central bank sets the interest rate influences the macroeconomic 
performance of fiscal policy and the intertemporal equilibrium between present and future 
consumption through the effects on the rate of actualization of future revenues (Canale 2008). The 
policy rate, set by the monetary authority, is, in fact, the reference value for the all the other interest 
rates, including the treasury bill rate. The latter in turn could diverge from the average of the market 
according to the country’s rating. The point is, therefore, to know whether and in which cases the 
debt-financed public expenditure can reduce the country’s rating. Therefore – even if it were 
possible to overcome the other limits of these contributions6 – whether or not the crowding-out 
effect or the Barro-Ricardo theorem applies, depends for the great part on the action of monetary 
policy (Canale, Foresti, Marani and Napolitano 2008). 
As a final point if fiscal policies increase private demand it is said to cause inflation because of the 
so-called real-balance effect. However, in order to state that an increase in demand causes an 
increase in prices, it has to be that: (a) the supply curve has a positive slope and if so (b) the 
increase in public expenditure does not cause a shift in the supply curve as well. However, very 
often, especially when government intervention is requested, there are a lot of unexploited 
resources, fixed investment is underutilized, and there would be many cases in which the relation 
between wages and productivity remains constant. The supply curve, therefore, could be horizontal 
and increase in demand would not create inflation. 
Despite the extensive empirical literature, an unambiguous conclusion has not yet been found even 
in this field. The debate concentrates on the  on the size of the overall output effect “wich is mostly 
found to be in the Keynesian direction” (von Hagen and Wyplosz 2008p.6). Following the 
theoretical assumptions, the literature concentrates on the long-run possible effects of un-predicted 
policy interventions and uses different versions of VAR approaches. However, many difficulties 
arise in examining the effects of governmental interventions (Perotti 2007): 
(a) the impossibility of separating the fiscal policy from monetary policy effects 
(b) the endogenity of fiscal policy effects 
(c) the identification of the structure of the economy. 
                                               
6
 There are in fact many shortcomings to be considered: they are related to life-term, wealth effects and to the general 
limits of intertemporal choice in conditions of underemployment when it is not possible to choose whether or not to 
work. 
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The most famous contributions are Ramsey and Shapiro (1999) (dummy variable approach), Fatás 
and Mihov (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002). All of these attempt to identify the fiscal 
stimulus separately from the monetary one, and the unexpected interventions from expected ones.  
Fatás and Mihov (2009) – assuming that sound public finance is an objective rather that an 
instrument -- document the evolution of fiscal balances in the Euro area. They find that because of 
the absence of discretionary interventions and the use of automatic stabilizers, government policies 
appear to be counter cyclical (i.e., having the opposite sign of output growth) and public accounts 
do not deteriorate, but help convergence towards the  full employment rate (for the same point of 
view, see also Alesina, Campante and Tabellini 2007). 
Following a different perspective, Gali and Monacelli (2005) provide an analysis of the effects of an 
exogenous change in government spending in a small open economy belonging to a monetary 
union: an increase in government spending always raises output and the price level in the short run. 
Many critiques on the approach denying the positive effects of fiscal policy interventions can be 
found on a special number of Oxford Review of Economic Policy (vol. 21(4), 2005) entirely 
dedicated to the macroeconomic role of government spending (see Allsopp and Vines 2005, 
Krugmann 2005, Solow 2005). Furthermore Kirsanova, Stehm and Vines (2005) find that, in 
modern policy regimes under which fiscal and monetary policy are independent, economic policy in 
a single country gives better results if both authorities cooperate to reach their goals. 
 
 
3. Policy actions in Italy before and after joining the EMU (1992–2008) 
The period from 1992 to 2008, was characterized by independent monetary policies and fiscal 
strategies oriented to the reorganization of public accounts in order to respect the Maastricht 
parameters and the Stability and Growth Pact. However the entire period can be divided into two 
parts – before and after 1998 – in relation to the adoption of the single currency. In the first period 
the policies, although autonomous, were in accordance with the objective of joining the Euro area, 
while the policies in the second period, as it is well known, were qualified by the transfer of 
monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank and by a fiscal policy action inside strict limits 
due to the pre-existence of fiscal imbalances.  
3.1 Fiscal and monetary conditions in Italy after the ERM crisis: 1992–1998 
In the 1970s and the early 1980s Italy experienced high inflation rates, but by 1992 inflation 
remained stable at approximately 5% for many years due to the dis-inflationary policy of the central 
bank. In fact in 1981 the Bank of Italy started its “divorce” from the Italian Treasury (it was no 
longer forced to act as a residual claimant of unsold Italian Treasury debt securities) and used 
interest rates to preserve the  participation of Italy to the ERM.  
At the beginning of 1990s, the process of German reunification, and the effects on internal income 
of the policy of increasing interest rates, brought the 1992 currency crisis (Canale, Montagnoli and 
Napolitano 2008). Unfortunately the higher rates of discount of preceding years, despite the 
progress in terms of inflation, caused an ever-increasing  deterioration of fiscal accounts. If the debt 
was 100% of GDP in 1992, it continued to grow rapidly; interest payments generated a vicious 
spiral and an ever-increasing burden on the budget. The large fiscal adjustment of 6% of GDP, 
approved by the government after the 1992 crisis, was only able to slow down the rate of growth of 
the debt.  
 
During 1996, it became increasingly clear that a strict adherence to the limit of a 3% deficit-to-GDP 
ratio in 1997 would be required of countries to be admitted to the European Monetary Union. To 
steer markets towards favourable expectations, in 1996 the Italian government increasingly stressed 
a commitment to the fiscal discipline needed to enter the EMU, and in the autumn of 1996, a 
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carefully crafted fiscal package of spending cuts and tax increases was approved. The size of the 
fiscal adjustment of 1996 was much smaller than the one that was approved in the wake of the 1992 
crisis, and it was just enough to tip the markets into believing that Italy would be able to join the 
EMU.  
 
Figure 1. Macroeconomic performance of fiscal and monetary policy in Italy from 1992 to 
1998 
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Source: IFM-Financial Statistics, ECB 
 
Figure 1 shows the behaviour of the monetary policy instrument (rep_rate), inflation rate 
(inflation), the growth rate of income (gdpgrowth) and fiscal balance (deficit) in the period 
considered. The behaviour of the line representing the GDP path clearly illustrates the periods of 
recession (1992) and slow-down of the economy (1995). It also shows that, starting from 1998, the 
growth of the Italian economy declined, reaching almost the value of zero. Except for the years 
1995-96, when the economy was growing at 5% due to the increase of exports via devaluation of 
the exchange rate, Italy experienced very low rates of growth. The inflation rate depicts a negative 
trend that, in 1998, reached the value of about 2.5%. The interest rate converged towards the value 
of 3% at the end of 1998 as required for joining the EMU by the prescriptions of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Finally, the deficit had non-negative values just at the beginning of 1998, but its trend 
during the whole period is guided by the target of fiscal balance. 
 
3.2 Fiscal and monetary conditions in Italy after introduction of the single currency 
In 1998 Italy joined the EMU and the Bank of Italy was reflected first by European Monetary 
Institute  and then at the launch of the Euro by the European Central Bank. The following years can 
be divided into two period. The first goes from 1999 to the end of 2001, when Italy experienced a 
relative high rate of growth. The second was characterized by two global shocks, the first in 2001, 
whose symbol is the events of 9/11, and the second the global financial crisis that started with the 
bursting of the US housing bubble at the end of 2007. 
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 Figure 2. Output growth in Italy from 1999 to 2008 
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Source: IFM-Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the growth rate of income for Italy after the EMU. The average rate was about 
0.6%, with peaks of 2.5% and -3.2%. However, it was much below the 5.26% consistent with the 
optimistic expectations of the European Commission when it fixed the ceiling level of 3% of ratio 
of deficit/GDP in order to ensure a convergence towards a stable management of public debt7. 
 
Figure 3. Public deficit in the Euro Area 
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This condition of instability has been shared by many other EMU countries. In Figure 3 we plot the 
general government primary balance as percentage of GDP for Ireland, Italy, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Germany and France. Except for Ireland – whose positive economic 
                                               
7In order to have a debt/GDP ratio of 60% - as Maastricht fiscal parameters state - and preserve the deficit/GDP ratio at 
3% it is necessary to have a growth rate of GDP equal to 5% (De Grauwe 2008). 
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conditions in that period are well-known – all the EU countries experienced difficulties in managing 
the ratio of deficit/GDP. In Italy (thick yellow line), the ratio always remains negative, despite the 
hard fiscal policy retrenchments set in the periods 1999-2000 and 2006-2007.  
Table 1 summarizes the main stability programmes proposed by the Italian government after the 
launch of the Euro. In the light of the considerations made above, it is clear that they failed in their 
aims. In fact, reading the table from left to right and from top to bottom we observe that the 
programmed levels of debt and deficit are never respected. 
 
Table 1. Key figures of Italy’s stability programmes (2000–2008) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
General 
government 
balance 
 
– 0.8 
 
– 0.5 
 
0 
 
0.3 
       
Primary 
balance 
 
5.3 
 
5.5 
 
5.6 
 
5.5 
       
Government 
debt 
 
106.6 
 
103.5 
 
99.6 
 
94.9 
       
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
 
2.9 
 
3.1 
 
3.1 
 
3.1 
       
General 
government 
balance 
  
-2.1 
 
-1.5 
 
-0.8 
 
-0.2 
 
0.1 
     
Primary 
balance 
 
 
3.8 
 
4.5 
 
5 
 
5.3 
 
5.5 
     
Government 
debt 
 
 
109.4 
 
105 
 
100.4 
 
98.4 
 
96.4 
     
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
 
 
0.6 
 
2.3 
 
2.9 
 
3 
 
3 
     
General 
government 
balance 
   
 
– 2.9 
 
– 2.7 
 
– 2.0 
 
– 1.4 
 
– 0.9 
   
Primary 
balance 
   2.4 2.5 3.3 4 4.7    
Government 
debt 
   106 104.1 101.9 99.2 98    
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
   1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3    
General 
government 
balance 
     -4.4 -2.4 -2.2 -1.5 -0.7 0 
Primary 
balance 
     0.1 2.5 2.6 3.4 4.2 4.9 
Government 
debt 
     106.8 105 103.5 101.5 98.5 95.1 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
     1.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 
General 
government 
balance 
       -2.6 -3.7 -3.3 -2.9 
Primary 
balance 
       2.5 1.3 1.9 2.6 
Government 
debt 
       105.9 110.5 112 111.6 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
       -0.6 -2 0.3 1 
Source: European Commission 
 
  
Confirming the initial strategy of fiscal discipline set in the Maastricht Treaty, and guided by the 
idea that sound public finances is a precondition for economic development, in the year 2000 the 
European Commission passed the following sentence on the Italian government:  
 
The Council urges Italy firmly to commit itself to respect the programme’s objectives. 
Primary surpluses should remain at the high levels projected in the programme. Any 
deviation from the planned deficit and primary surplus outcomes should be promptly 
addressed and corrective measures taken. This should be ensured through a tight control 
of current primary expenditure. The Council encourages Italy to accompany the reduction 
in the ratio of current primary expenditure to GDP with a more effective and more 
comprehensive rationalisation of public spending, aimed at improving the supply-side 
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conditions of the economy. Moreover, even though Italy fulfils the requirements of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, it should take every opportunity to improve future budgetary 
targets and speed up the consolidation process, in order to accelerate the reduction of the 
government debt ratio. The Council recommends that future decisions to reduce the tax 
and social security contributions  burden  should  be  matched  by  offsetting expenditure 
cuts8. 
 
The reorganization of fiscal accounts is explicitly considered an objective to be reached as soon as 
possible as a precondition for economic development. The sentence quoted above explains that, for 
the European Commission, the reduction of the taxation and social security contributions via cuts in 
the government’s expenditure could have a positive effect on the economy. Unfortunately, Italy’s 
macroeconomic performance in the decade after 1999 dramatically worsened relative to the average 
of the other members of the Euro area.  
In the early 1990s, the vigorous increase in exports compensated the weakness of the domestic 
demand, while in the years after, the fiscal adjustment required by EMU and the inflation-targeting 
strategy of the centralized monetary policy might explain the evolution of the macroeconomic 
performance (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Macroeconomic performance of fiscal and monetary policy in Italy 
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The average growth rate of income was about 0.8% with peaks of 3.2% and -3.5%.  It was a bit 
higher than in the pre-EMU period but still below the 5.6% required to make the debt converge to 
60% of GDP. The discount rate, the main instrument of monetary policy, appears having been 
growing from 1991 to 2001, while decreasing in the years after. At the end of 2005 it starts growing 
again in response to the average inflation dynamic in the EMU. The entire period is also 
characterized by a low level of inflation (2.3% on average) which starts increasing again at the end 
of 2007.  Finally as already shown in Figure 3, the dynamic of public deficit was ever guided by the 
attempt to respect the Stability and Growth Pact, without taking care of its effects on output growth. 
Taking a global look at the macroeconomic performance of Italy in these years, we can say that, 
despite the initial positive influence derived from the gain in credibility for having joined the EMU, 
                                               
8
 European Economy. European Commission. Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Public Finance 
in EMU, no. 3, 2001, p. 148. 
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from 2001, the increase in the discount rate is accompanied by a decrease – with some time delay – 
in output growth, and vice versa. Furthermore, in the period 2006–2008, the tight ECB policy was 
associated with a restrictive fiscal policy. The reduction of public funds, especially for education, 
scientific research, innovation, business support, investment, and so on, resulted in significant 
economic decline, triggering a perverse cycle with further negative effects on public accounts9. 
Lacking the private demand because of the crisis, these combined policies hardly influenced the 
sharp decrease of the growth rate of income from 2007. However, empirical results will show that 
without the ever-reduced level of public expenditure, the macroeconomic performance would have 
been worse than it was.  
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 The theoretical model 
The model we use for the empirical analysis follows the theoretical assumption that current income 
is the result of the effects of the components  of aggregate demand. Because we do not suppose that 
current income is simultaneously determined by its components, our model is represented by the 
following: 
 
( )t t iY f Z −=           (1) 
 
Where t iZ −  synthesizes the lagged variables influencing gross domestic product. 
The value of the index t i−  varies in relation to the lags considered to be relevant in influencing 
current income: 
1
2
3
....
....
t i
t i
t i
t i
nt i
z
z
z
Z
z
−
−
−
−
−
 
 
 
 
=  
 
 
 
  
  
 
Where the first index indicates the independent variable, while the second is the time lag considered, 
so that it can be i = 1, 2, 3… 
We can rewrite our model as: 
 
0 1 1, 2 2, 3 3, ,.......t t i t i t i n n t iY z z z zβ β β β β− − − −= + + + + +       (2) 
 
In order to study  the influence of monetary and fiscal policy separately and avoid problems of 
autocorrelation – very difficult to overcome in these cases – we consider one variable at a time so 
that we estimate the value of each coefficient:  
 
                                               
9
 Moreover, among the various economic fundamentals that contributed to the degradation of the Italian capacity of 
exports, there is also the factor of labour productivity. For Italy and Spain, that productivity has remained essentially 
unchanged  from 1999 to 2008. Conversely, it increased considerably in France (+9.6%) and Germany (+9.5%), which 
contributed to increase the average level of the EMU (+7.7%). 
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1
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−
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or, as one would say, ceteris paribus. 
 
We use the OLS technique since it better captures the effects of the components of aggregate 
demand on equilibrium income in the short run, taking into account not only the deviation from the 
original path, but especially the overall contribution to equilibrium income. As a final step we 
examine the variation of the coefficients weight over time. Using the Kalman filter technique we 
evaluate during the time interval considered the way in which fiscal and monetary policy has 
influenced the value of GDP. 
 
 
4.2 Empirical results 
The time interval is ten years, from 1998 to 2009 and data are from ISTAT, EUROSTAT and ECB 
databases quarterly adjusted. Most time series are seasonally adjusted by the source. Whenever this 
is not the case, we seasonally adjust the respective series using the Census X11 multiplicative 
procedure. The chosen time period is based on the effective launch of the EMU, which took place in 
January 1998 with the creation of the European Central Bank.  
Definition of variables and descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are provided 
respectively in Table 2 
 
Table 2 - Definition of variables 
Variable Description (source) 
NGDP Nominal Gross Domestic Product (source ISTAT) 
 
RGDP
 
Real Gross Domestic Product (source ISTAT) 
 
EXP
 
Total Government Expenditure seasonal adjusted (source ISTAT) 
 
REPR
 
Repurchase rate (source European Central Bank) 
 
HCPI 
 
REV 
 
DEB 
Harmonised Consumer Price Index (source ISTAT) 
 
Total Government revenue seasonal adjusted (source ISTAT) 
 
Public Debt (source ISTAT) 
  
 
A first step of analysis is referred to a stationary relationship between integrated time series.  
A formal test for stationary or the presence of a unit root was implemented and as Table 3 shows, 
the result strongly suggested that all the variables were integrated of order one I ∼ (1).  
 
Tab. 3. Test for stationarity 
 
 
 
ADF 
Phillips Perron  1st difference  
ADF 
Phillips Perron test 
NGDP -2.409 -2.410 ∆NGDP -4.176 -4.214 
RGDP -3.453 -3.156 ∆RGDP -4.677 -4.698 
EXP -0.138 -0.332 ∆EXP -8.179 -29.14 
REPR -1.849 -1.961 ∆REPR -4.490 -6.399 
REV -1.550 -0.161 ∆REV -35.94 -47.39 
DEB -0.955 -0.989 ∆DEB -9.862 -13.44 
Sample 1999:1  2009:1 
ADF crit. val. (1 %)  -3.60 
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In fact, in Table 3 we present the ADF and Phillips Perron tests. At the level (left side), we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no stationarity. However, taking the first difference, the results of the 
two tests  allow us to reject the null hypothesis. This implies that all the variables are integrated of 
order one. These results reinforce the outcomes  of the regression presented below. 
Once assumed that all variables are integrated of the same order, the next step concerns the concept 
of cointegration.  This refers to a stationary relationship between integrated time series.  In order 
evaluate a possible long-run relationship between the variables we are going to analyse, for each 
regression we will present the cointegration test. 
Our first estimate concerns the effects of public expenditure on gross domestic product (Table 4). 
The dependent variable NGDP represents the nominal index number of gross domestic product, 
while EXP  represents the nominal index of total government expenditure. 
 
Table 4.  Public expenditure effects on nominal GDP  
Dependent Variable: NGDP  
Section 1 Cointegration test on the residuals 
 
ADF Phillips Perron test 
Restab4 6.90 7.44 
ADF crit. val. (1 %)  -3.61 
Section 2 OLS regression 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 15.714** 2.97 
EXP(-1) 0.765*** 23.49 
R2 0.937 
Obs.: 39, Sample (adjusted): 1999:02; 2008:4 
D-W stat: 2.15; AIC 5.462; F stat 552.15*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level 
 
We consider a one-period time lag. The empirical results show that the Italian government 
expenditure of the previous period had a positive correlation with nominal current income from 
1998 to 2008. The empirical relation appears to be a long period one because of the results of the 
cointegration test. 
 
Table 5 Public expenditure  and Revenues effects on real GDP 
Dependent Variable: RGDP  
Section 1 Cointegration test on the residuals 
 
ADF Phillips Perron test 
Restab4 -4.923 -5.031 
ADF crit. val. (1 %)  -3.62 
Section 2 OLS regression 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 7.433 1.093 
RGDP(-1) 0.956*** 11.946 
EXP(-2) 0.039* 1.748 
REV(-2) -0.052** -2.160 
R2 0.977 
Obs.: 38, Sample (adjusted): 1999:02; 2008:4 
D-W stat: 1.669; AIC 2.289; F stat 483.276*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level  
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In order to overcome the criticism that the effect is just nominal, the make a different regression 
using as a dependent variable the real index of NGDP, RGDP, derived by dividing NGDP by the 
HCPI the harmonised consumer price index. In this regression we introduce an autoregressive 
component and evaluate the joined effects of nominal expenditure and total revenues on RGDP. 
Table 5 shows first of all that variables are cointegrated. Therefore there is a long-run relationship 
between RGDP on one side and the explanatory variables on the other. 
Furthermore we observe that the effects on RGDP are 1) for public expenditure positive – despide 
reduced-RGDP; 2) for public revenues a negative. These results are consistent with the Keynesian 
theory. 
Table 6 evaluate the effects of the European Central Bank monetary policy strategy on internal 
income expressed in terms of real index. The dependent variable is the real index of GDP,  RGDP, 
while the independent variable in the repurchase rate (Table 6). The repurchase rate  – set by the 
central bank – is the lowest rate it is possible to find in the market, i.e., the floor of the interest rate 
corridor, and represents the reference value of all the re-financing operations of the economy. We 
see in Table 6 that the sign of the coefficient is negative.  
 
Table 6. Real effect of monetary policy strategy  
Dependent Variable: RGDP 
Section 1 Cointegration test on the residuals 
 
ADF Phillips Perron test 
Restab6 -5.595 -5.643 
ADF crit. val. (1 %)  -3.62 
Section 2 OLS regression 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 10.62128*** 
 
3.430827 
RGDP(-1) 0.924243*** 38.34049 
Rep_rate(-2) -0.317137** -2.338799 
R2 0.977134; Adjusted R2 0.975827 
Obs.: 38; Sample (adjusted): 1999:03 2008:4 
D-W stat 1.936779; AIC 2.234471; F stat 747.8319*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level  
 
 
Table 7. Real effect of public debt 
Dependent Variable: RGDP 
Section 1 Cointegration test on the residuals 
 
ADF Phillips Perron test 
Restab7 -4.858 -5.026 
ADF crit. val. (1 %)  -3.60 
Section 2 OLS regression 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C 19.96988*** 7.230646 
RGDP(-1) 0.772619*** 17.88903 
Deb(-1) 0.078703*** 2.755561 
R2  0.9839600; Adjusted R20.983158 
Obs.: 43; Sample (adjusted): 1998:02 2008:4 
D-W stat 1.634168; AIC 2.482092; F stat 1226.903*** 
*significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level  
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Thus because of the direct proportionality between the interest rates the central bank sets and the 
average rates the monetary and financial institutions apply – in the years considered, monetary 
policy had a negative effect on RGDP. Once again – as the ADF test shows the variables are linked 
in the long-run. 
Finally, despite all the suggestions coming from the theoretical literature about public debt, evidence 
emerging from Italian data shows that the level of debt has effects of the same sign on the real GDP 
index (Table 7) and the effects are persistent in the lon-run. 
These results appear to operate in a sense opposite to Barro’s theoretical conclusions about the 
public bonds wealth effect. 
 
 
4.3 Incidence of policies through time ( the Kalman filter) 
In this final section we implement the Kalman filter methodology. This algorithm, which provides the 
recursive estimation of unobserved, time-varying parameters or variables in the system contingent 
on all available information, will allow us to investigate further the behaviour of coefficients of the 
policy variables. The reason for applying the Kalman filter at this stage is that this time-varying 
methodology is able to recover unobservable factors related to fiscal and monetary policy that could 
have affected Italian GDP from 1998 to 2008, i.e.,  to detect how the respective coefficients have 
changed over time10. 
Assuming that βi,t is determined by an autoregressive process AR(n), we apply the following time- 
varying parameters model: 
 
 t 0 ,t 1 ,t t tiy = β + β Z +µ      (3)     
Where yt is the GDP at time t, µit is an independent white noise, the vector of coefficients βi,t is 
assumed to be random walks. This can be written in state space form where the observation equation is 
given by the expression in (3) above and the state equations are given by: 
 
 
0, 1, 0, 0,0.
1, 1, 1, 1,1.
...1 0
...0 1
t t n tt
t t n tt
β β µβ
β β µβ
− −
− −
= +
      
      
      
 (4) 
 
The above eq. (4) is the measurement equation in which βit and µit are [n×1] vectors11.  The relevant 
results and estimates are reported in Table 8 and in Figures 5 and 6. 
The coefficients have the correct signs and are highly significant. Overall, the patterns of the 
coefficients βit (see Figures 5 and 6) seem to add insightful elements to the analysis of the dynamics 
of the fiscal and monetary variables over the period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10
 “[...] when the disturbances and the initial state vector are normally distributed, it enables the likelihood function to be 
calculated via what is known as the prediction error decomposition. This opens the way for estimation of any unknown 
parameters in the model.” (Harvey 1991, p. 10). 
11
 For a more complete explanation of the Kalman filter approach, the state space form and the measurement and 
transition equations, see Harvey (1989). 
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Tab le 8. The Kalman estimations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Monetary policy coefficient behaviour 
 
 
Indeed, it is interesting to observe (Figure 5) that a significant change in the pattern of the 
coefficients b (the interest rate) occurs a few years after the introduction of the Euro (2001). 
Another change in the pattern, around 2006, is also shown by the coefficient on the interest rate 
moving from a negative to a positive trend. This change and the value of this coefficient suggest 
that the effect of the monetary policy instrument started to adjust in anticipation of the financial 
crises. The adjustment took place well before the crisis was officially accepted. Not surprisingly the 
coefficient on the interest rate does not show a positive value. It moves to a value close to zero at 
the end of 2008. This represents a kind of proof of the fact that in a time of crisis monetary policy is 
unable to stabilize output. The lowering of interest rates cannot inject money into private markets if 
it cannot be used productively. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Fiscal policy coefficient behaviour 
(rep_rate) 
1,tβ  2,tβ  
AIC=7.03 
Schwarz=7.07 
Obs. 38(Q) 
127.03** 
(76.59) 
[ 0.000] 
-0.2865** 
(-11.29) 
[ 0.003] 
(Govern. 
Expenditure) 1,t
β
 2,tβ  
AIC=8.61 
Schwarz=8.65 
Obs. 39 (Q) 
73.81** 
(6.687 ) 
[ 0.000] 
0.50111** 
(6.054) 
[ 0.000] 
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At the other extreme, the coefficient on the government expenditure shows positive and stedily 
increasing dynamics over the whole period (Figure 6). To a more careful interpretation, this pattern 
should not be surprising since the β1 coefficient captures the effect on GDP of actual government 
expenditure. Summarizing, the analysis shows that the introduction of the Euro has implied a 
stronger impact of the fiscal variable and less stable coefficients for the monetary variable.  
 
 
5. Policy structure and the future of EMU 
 
European policy framework relies on two pillars: (1) a monetary policy with the final aim of stable 
inflation, and (2) rigid fiscal rules relegating government action to a very marginal role. While these 
two pillars appeared to be of benefit for Italy in the period preceding the Euro, in the latter phase, 
especially during the last five years, they seem to have weakened Italy’s economic growth. 
From the empirical analysis it emerges that fiscal policy in this last ten years had effects of the same 
sign on growth and that the centralized monetary policy was not neutral in relation to the effect on 
GDP. These effects appeared to be reinforced when the components of aggregate demand linked to 
private choices were lacking, i.e., over a financial crisis. 
In particular, examining the influence of public expenditure on growth through time we observe an 
increasing value, demonstrating that government spending had a central role in sustaining demand.  
Examining then the effects of monetary policy, it is possible to conclude that the interest rate setting 
practice had not only anti-inflationary effects, but also real effects. However, the power of 
influencing the economic performance of Italy in periods of crisis appeared to be very weak, 
because of the impossibility of injecting money into the market when it is not desired, i.e., when 
aggregate demand is lacking.  
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the European policy framework was not built to confront the recent 
depression because it relies exclusively on the action of the market. We can add that the absence of 
fiscal instruments and the centralized monetary action cultivate the seeds of a further instability 
because of the non-neutrality of monetary policies. In short, the European policy framework 
subordinates employment and growth to sound public finance and price stability. However, the 
experience of the global economic crisis has shown that containing  inflation, deficit and public debt 
is not enough to fight unemployment.  On the contrary, as more recent events show, the unique 
objective of the internal stability of the currency ultimately weakens the existence of the EMU. Like 
any fixed exchange rate system, if the costs of preserving the parity are too high, the existence of the 
agreements will appear to be at risk (Krugman 2009a). 
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